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ABSmCI
The extent to which the duties and functions of
the President of the United States, as set down by the
Constitution, are fulfilled depends on the nan holding
office and on his concept of that position.

In study

ing the political career of John F# Kennedy it is possible
to trace his concept of that office, changes in that view,
and the action taken to fulfill a U aspects of that notion#
4 study of President Kennedy*s speeches, press
Interviews, literary efforts,, and governmental actions
point out the changes in Kennedy*s concept of the office
in both its domestic and international aspects#

These

primary sources extend from his first Congressional term
in 1 9 ^ through his Presidential term ending in 1963#
It is the aim of this thesis to discuss the con
ceptual changes that occurred before and after President
Kennedy was elected to that office and to examine some
factors influencing these diverse opinions#

An attempt

will be made to discuss the relationship of President
Kennedy* s idea of the presidency to Cl) the Constitutionallybased traditional concept! (2) his own gradually changing
notion of the office; and (3) the manner in which his view
of the presidential role was implemented#
iii
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confused and confusing. His goals for himself and for the
nation were high, hut idealism seemed to he the answer*

The

young are Inclined to he idealistic, and youth responded to
Kennedy.
To idealistic, young people, to skeptical intellectualst
to Americans weary of the materialism and mass culture
of their societyy he struck all the right notes* They
listened to his eloquence, were fascinated by his
style, approved his distinction and his wit.l
Kennedy was a young man driving to the top*

His

push for the presidential nomination and for eventual election
worn him both criticism2 and admiration.

His name became a

household word not only In the Halted States but in many
countries throughout the world*
were explained away as mistakes.
by the President#

Mistakes were made, but they
Responsibility was accepted

He did not suffer from such acceptance*

It

became a matter of honour* ;The abortive attempt to rid Cuba
of Castro, culminating in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and the re
sultant furor caused by American complicity was a low point in
a political career that never seemed to reach a zenith, but
seemed to keep climbing*

Setbacks occurred, but the Kennedy

name rose above them#
The explanation of the Kennedy Mphenomenon” and of
the Kennedy popularity lies in the man himself.

The president

became the living image of a young man on the move*3 He was
% a a Wicker, "Kennedy was a Pomander, Johnson is an
Accompllsher", Detroit Free Press. January 20, 1965*
% e e V. hasky, J L M * s 3Eht„iiia...infl,

1962).

(Hew York,

3§ee Jim Bishop, A Bar in the Life of President Kennedy,
(lew York, 196*0.
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3
the All-American boy, the Superman of Polities, capable of
achieving the impossible and sometimes more, tout he was not a
man one could deal with objectively*
Kennedy’s opponents held the Bay of Pigs up for
scrutiny and recalled the so-called double dealing that oecurmd.
Els supporters studied that same incident and stated that such
action could be explained,

Kennedy's advisors were misinformed,

he trusted that Information, and he had no reason to question
the advice of governmental experts.
The domestic crisis over civil rights, the riots in
Mississippi, the use of federalized troops in Alabama and the
governmental pressure exerted on the steel companies led to
charges, of a growth in' the power of the central government, a
growth that, unchecked, could mean, an end to the private enter
prise system on which the United States was founded.

Those

same incidents and the actions taken in response to those events
were cited by Kennedy supporters as necessary for the welfare
of the United States and as the result of conscientious think
ing and strong conviction*
John F, Kennedy was the man to be admired, copied,
criticized when things did not go as well as some thought they
should*

He was the man of the sixties, the man of the hour*

The exact worth of that hour will not be decided in the years
or decades immediately following its destruction, but an attempt
will be made here to discuss some of the aspects that might
possibly shed some light on Kennedy's significance*
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II
THE CHANGING C M Q & T OF THE PRESIDENCY
Xht ,Coaa.Ujfea^m3..
No foreign institution compares with the American
Presidency# It has bean said that th® President
of th® Halted States Is hath more and less than a
king, nor® and less than a prime minister, and may
act as either or both at the same time, when nee*
essary ... Th# President's high offlee la a unique
amalgam of prerogatives that make him, if he chooses
to exercise these, the most powerful elected official
on earth*1*
The personality, the foreefulness of th® man ©loo
ted to the office of President determines, to a large extent,
the prestige and power of the Presidency*

The American Pres

idency is more than th© sum of Its parts or the aggregation
of the powers and functions of that office*

The Presidency

is an elective office, established by Constitutional provi
sion, and molded by the man in office#^ The Presidency is
not restricted to the Constitutional concept envisioned by
the Framers of that document,' but has become the product of
an historical evolution*
Every man who has ever served as President of the
United States has added something to — and per
haps subtracted something from — .the role of the
Presidency during his incumbency.0
^enry haCossitt, "Politics for Americans —
Hit,,,11111111, Mi,Of Fol* lb, May-duse, 1961, p.16*
%f% g e r , J*P, Harris, H
1963), pp* 1-2* ■

i

t

,

The Presidency",
» (Toronto,

6Ibld*. p* 2.
b
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5
th® Presidency! a* established by the Constitution,
does, in feet, stand out in stark contrast t© the actual pro
gressive development of that office*
the authority of the Chief Executive today rests
on far more than the loos® constitutional founda
tion. It is the composite of the powers asserted
by Presidents during the history of the Republic,
which have, by dint of repeated exercise, attained
the status of powers authorised by constitutional
usage or convention.?
This progressive expansion of the Presidency can
be traced from the first Constitutional concept to that of
present day politicians*
.lit,JsMifcili, Efaamt
The office of the American Presidency, as estab
lished in 1789, was designed to “reproduce the monarchy of
g

George III, with th© corruption left out.»,v This reproduc
tion was not Intended to be an exact duplication of the
British monarchy, tut was to be a revised edition of the
British executive*
for revision.

Colonial experience had dictated the need

Th® abuses inherent in the reign of George III

were to be avoided at all cost*

The Framers of the Constitu

tion were apprehensive about anything that was strictly Brit
ish in nature .as

well as toward anything presenting even the

possibility of a corrupt usurpation of power on the part of

the,

^Bernard Schwarts, h ............................ .ti£
C»ew fork, 1963), Fart I, Vol. II, p. b.

^Edward g, Corwin, the Frasldsnti Q f f t e ,ftfld
(lew York, 1957)# 9* If*
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tii# executive*9
The opponent# of a strong Chief Executive based
their stand on the English fe&ig belief that th# legislative
power, fey Its very nature, served the popular will, while
th# executive power wast by nature, moaarchlal*

At this

tine th# image presented by the Monarchy of Georg© III
equated aonarchl&l rul# with tyrannical ml#*10

The con

clusion reached by these m m rested on th© belief that "the
President should be nothing store than an institution for
carrying the will of the Legislature into effect."1*
On the other hand, supporters of a strong Presidency
held a view consistent with that expressed by Ooveraeur Morris
It Is necessary that th# Executive Magistrate should
be the guardian of the people* even of the lower
classes, against Legislative tyranny, against the
treat and the wealthy who* In the course of things,
will necessarily eonpose — the Legislative Body*
Wealth tends to corrupt the mind and nourish, its
love of power, and to stimulate It to oppression,
history proves this to be the spirit of the opulent
i«. The executive therefore ought to be so consti
tuted as to be the great protector of the Hass of
the people*12
^
r
The decision finally reached at the Constitutional
Convention called for a Chief Executive whose powers were to
be United by Constitutional provision.

The limitations

placed on the fresident followed, to son# extent, the theories
pp. I5-M.
l°Egger A Harris, on.eit*. p. 6.
lllbld., p* 6*
l^Ibid.» p. #, In.
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developed by both Montesquieu end Blackstone*

This eon-

cept of a balanced constitution exhibited the Idea of "a
divided Initiative In the natter of legislation and a
broad range of autonomous executive power or prerogative."13
the President, for example, m s given the power to sake
treaties, provided he had obtained the advice and consent
of the Senate, two-thirds of those Senators present and
voting agreeing to the terras of the treaty.

This depend

ency on Senate approval of treaties strengthened the
existence of the system of checks and balances and, at the
same time, provided the machinery necessary for the devel
opment of th® separation of powers doctrine.
The Constitution stated the functions and duties
of the President In general rather than specific terms?
for example| Article 11, Section I, paragraph 1 states that
"the executive power shall be vested In a President of the
United States of America*"

The definition of the office

itself Is expressed In broad terms, the limits of authority
left almost completely to the Interpretation desired by the
man In office.

Th® President had been vested with the ex

ecutive power in the government, "the vulnerable part of
any republic*"^

He had been limited to some extent in

the exercise of powers ranging from the making of treaties
to the appointment of ambassadors, public consuls and min
isters, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers
13Corwin, on.clt.. p. lb.
^Schwarts, op.clt.f p. 3.
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of the United States*

And yet, he had been named Coamander-

ia-Chief of '♦the army and the nary of the United States,
and of the militia of the several States, when sailed into
the actual service of the United States.” (Article II, Sec*
tion II, paragraph 1.)

The powers of the President, while

considered necessary for the preservation of the union, as
outlined by the Constitution, lack th® detailed precision
characteristic of the articles defining the authority of
the other governmental branches*2^

A personal development

of the office, of its powers and functions, m s implicitly
called for In the Constitution.
This Implied self-determination of action has en
abled the office to develop along the lines considered most
beneficial In reference to the needs of the nation at any
particular tim©.2^
the prevailing American dream in 17&9 conjured
a predominately rural republic, with a President
to execute and administer the lawsf but these
laws were to be passed by a Congress of elected
representatives of the people* in which reposed
the real governmental power.1"
The intent of the Framers of the Constitution then
was to establish an executive with specific powers and to
place restrictions on those powers in the form of a legis
lative body dwdly elected and authorised by the citizen pop
ulation, with the added safeguard of an independent Judicial
^Schwartz, op,clt.f pp. 1-3#
16Ibid.. pp. 1-3*
■^LaCossltt, os.elt.. p. 17.
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body*

This was tbs original concept of tbs presidency*

The Constitution resolved tbs problem of setting up a
national executive "which was both potent enough to deal
effectively with the problems facing the nation andf at
the same time, not so strong that it would overwhelm the
other two departments.”18

The basic security against an

abuse of power on the part of the President was placed
.in reliance on the tenet of public responsibility*
Where all power is derived from the people* and
public functionaries, at short intervals, de
posit it at the feet of the people, to be re
sumed again, only at their will, individual
fears may be alarmed by the monsters of imagi
nation, but individual liberty can be in little
danger*19
.

'The presidency today follows the outlines set
down in general terms by the Constitution in 1739, but the
demands of time, th© pressure of the constantly changing
international and national political scenes have enlarged
the scope of power and influence, and have served to clearly
affirm th© impact of personality m

the prestige and might

of the office itself*
The presidency is distinctly more powerful* It
cuts deeply into the powers of Congresst in
fact* it has suite reversed tide expectations of
the framers by becoming itself a vortex into which
these powers have been drawn in massive amounts*
It cuts deeply into the lives of the people ...
Whether as legislator, opinlon-maker, eoamander,
l8Schwarts,

PP* 2-3*

^ibid*, p* 3#
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or administrator, the president molds lasting
fallen In ©very sector of American life*20
The office of the President of th© United States
held a position of dignity daring Washington's term as
Chief Ixecutiv©.

Th© prestige of the nan himself served

as a spotlight on the office and focused attention ©a the
presidency at a tiae when the preponderance of an elected
legislative body, the Congress of the United States, was
uppermost in the minds of the young nation's leaders*

Th©

struggle for legislative supremacy as opposed to presi
dential autonomy had been resolved, to some extent, by the
Constitution*

A controversy involving th© nature of exec

utive power occurred in spite of the stature and prestige
of Washington.25' The Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793
serves as a precise case in point of this controversy,
Jefferson, Secretary of State in Washington* a
Cabinet, held that such a proclamation could not be made
on the constitutional grounds that "such a declaration was
a declaration of no war and it was not for the Executive to
decide the question of war on the negative or the affirm
ative side*1*22

This notion that the power of the executive

was faced with limitations in regard to authority carried
through into Jefferson*» own term as President, at least on
2%Hnt©ii lossiter,
1956, pp. oO—ol•
Committee on Government Operations,
m i

f

(Washington, 195/)* PP* 15-16*

(New York,
J&igst
.

22Committ©e on Government Operations, on.clt.* p.16.
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a theoretical basis*2^
^ Alexander Hamilton, also a member of Washington1s
Cabinet, halt a slaw directly opposing Jefferson*s.

In

essence Hamilton argued that the executive power clause in
Article 11 of the Constitution was a grant of power in it*
self and authorized Washington's action in the natter of
neutrality.2**
In the years following Washington's tern of office,
the concept of the presidency and the extent of presidential
powers reaained eomparatively static,*

the election of

Andrew Jackson was to alter radically the earlier Ideas of
the President and M s authority.

Th® Jacksonian concept

of the presidency revolved around the notion of presidential
autonomy.

He contended that "the President's duty to the

Constitution is solely the duty of conscience that his oath
imposes."2^
In defending his position concerning presidential
supremacy Jackson stated that*
...it was settled by the Constitution, the laws
and the whole practice of the government that
the entire executive power is vested in the
President of the Halted States.2®
The Jacksonian concept provided the basis on which
Abraham Lincoln was to defend M s presidential actions.
2%or*iaf op.cit.y p. 307*
theory Jefferson supported
the supremacy of th© legislature over executive autonomy. In
reality, M s personality controlled Congress*
^Ccaralttee on Governaent Operations, op.cit.. p* IS.
2^Corwin, op.ctt.f P. 311*
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Mneal&t in claiming that the president had the power to
meet an emergency without waiting for Congressional action,
derived M s authority fro® the notion held by Jackson and
fro® the precedent set by the Supreme Court decision, in
Luther v#. Borden (X8bp)t that insurrection is war*2?
Lincoln's claim was not accepted without opposi
tion*

Chief Justice fancy held that

...to suppose that the President could act on
M s own judgment is to fvppoc** that he be**
conferred upon him more regal, and absolute power
over the liberty of the cltlsen than the people
of Unhand have thought it safe to intrust to
the Crown — a power which the Queen of Sngland
cannot exercise at this day and w M gh could not
have bean lawfully exercised by the sovereign
even in the reign of Charles tee First**©
' Lincoln, on tee other hand, saw the President as
a leader answerable to tee people*
He.must choose tee hard duty of preserving tec
Union, even if it meant tee violation of every
.other precept of the Constitution* tense pre
cepts were not written into tee document to en
able those tec * invoking their literal meaning*
would destroy the whole of which they were part.
Because he .had been elected by all tee people,
he must, even without tee consent of Congress
or Court, do teat was necessary.29
Xn the years following Lincoln, tee presidential
role ted tee various concepts governing teat position re
volved mainly around tee controversy of legislative suprem
acy versus executive autonomy*

Legislative power became

the dominant element on tee American political scene and
^Corwin, on.elt«. pp* 310-311*
28fugwell, cm«..clt«f p. 160.
^fugwcil, pjuaLt.j p. 157*
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313
remained so until the arrival of Theodore Roosevelt in the
White House*
Roosevelt was a staunch supporter of shat became
known as the stewardship theory of the presidency.

Ac

cording to this concept, the President nay take any action
in the interest of the nation which is sot forbidden by
the lavs or the Constitution*

Roosevelt a&de the pres

idency "the ©entre of the American political system***^
1 am inclined to adopt the view that what was
imperatively necessary for the Ration could
not be 4mm by the President unless he could
find some specific authorization to do it* My
belief was that it was not only his right but
his duty to do anything that the needs of the
Ration demanded unless such action was forbidden
by the Constitution or by the lav* X did not
usurp powers, but X J & d greatly broaden the use
of Executive power*31
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt expressed the
same general view along stronger lines*

He statedt

I cannot tell what powers may have to be exer
cised In order 'to win this war* The American
people can be sure that X will use my powers
with a full sense of ay responsibility to the
Constitution and to ay country* The American
people can also be sure that X shall not hesi
tate to use every power vested in me to ac
complish the defeat of cur enemies in any part
of the world where our own safety demands such
defeat* When the war Is wen, the powers under
which X act automatically revert to the people to whoa they b e l o n g #3*
Franklin P* Roosevelt*s theory of the presidency
was made manifest in the executive initiative taken with
3%emmilte© on Government Operations, op.cit*. p* Xb*
% M d . , *. 15.
3%o*alttm on OovaiUMnt Operation*, on.alt., p. 1$.
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1**
the introduction of the lev ©eel end later in his direction
of the American war effort#

the President and his office

became the focal point of American political thought and
action*

this sane concept of a strong Chief Incentive

carried over into the Kennedy view of the presidency*
She varying v i e w of the American Presidency point
to the development of that office, its powers and its func
tions as a variable, dependent on. the personality of the nan
in office, on the crises with which he mist cope, on the
attitude of the Congress toward the Chief Executive, and on
the influence exerted by previous Presidents#^
The concept of presidential power had changed
Of
to national crises#

AS John F# Kennedy

prepared himself for the presidency he became more convinced
that strong leadership would be necessary to meet the chal
lenge of the I960*s.

he tools: his cue from the iniatlves of

the most forceful presidents in American history*

^%he importance of the attitude of the Congress toward
th® President is clearly shown in a comparison of the legisla
tive aspirations of Kennedy and the legislative accomplish
ments of Johnson ««s their rcaneebAw# relations with fionmress#
"Kennedy made demands) Johnson makes promises* Circumstances
that he quickly seised, together with his own approach, gave
Johnson, a chance to create a different atmosphere* Sis leadershls mar not seem so bold or dcuBdlsK or inssirine as
Kennedy|:s but it has persuaded some men to do what they ought
to do without persuasion** Wicker, os*.elt«T editorial page*
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E n E * l CCMCBFf OF THE PRISIBBHCY
g m
ASB0MXM THAT OFFICE
Ijffmt#1a, jSeyfeJjalUgR
Kennedy, as a student, as an athlete, as the sob
of the Ambassador to the Court.of St..Jams* and as the
grandson of not on® hat.two political legends, was in*
financed In his reasoning and in his persistent drive to
reach .the top In American politics by the circumstances
of his descant and by the precedents set,, over the years,
by his predecessors,

Kennedy ms also influenced la the

development of his ova individual concept of the presiden
cy by his years on Capitol Bill as both a Representative
and a Senator, and as a potential vice-presidential candi
date in 1956.

the widely publicised history of the Kennedy family
has aroused admiration in some quarters and censure in others.
It was this background. however, that made John F« Kennedy
the competitor he proved to be, and drove him to search for
the answers to any number of problems whose solutions he
sought in the office of the president.
faking the Kennedy family as a whole, It might be
eelS that family unity and strength revolved around poli
ties.
15
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B o m of a political family, la one of the most
political of cities. Kennedy ... is very much
the product of political combat*_kTo him9 poli
ties Is the art of the p o s s i b l e # ^
Survival within the Kennedy Clan is dependent on
the rough-md-tumbl® give and. take characteristic of any
number of large American families, and yet, the Kennedy
Clan, was unique in many respects*
Everybody who knows the Kennedys talks about
the fierceness of the deep competitive drive
that the father has instilled In the sons*
& close friend of the family says, “Iteether
it's a subcommittee hearing or a game of touch
football at the Washington Monument* they*re
out for blood*11 k l&shlngtoii reporter sums
up the Kennedy1# with a line from a pep talk
that he overheard Bob giving to one of hi«
seven small children. “Let’s swing higher and
try for a new record* k Kennedy shouldn’t be
scared**!?
This competitive drive was not limited to the
field of athletics or physical ability, but extended into
all fields of activity*

The Kennedy# were made constantly

aware of affairs in the world of politics and were expected
to keep abreast of events as they occurred, forming their
own reasoned opinion of the significance of those events.^
Joseph P* Kennedy, Jr. was being groomed for the
presidency*

“The ambition for the presidency in the Kennedy

household was b o m with Joe Jr*

History cut Joe Jr.*a

career shortj his kid brother, his closest rival, his closest
#*

j f e j y ? A Bams,

Clew York, I960), pp. ix,kii*
35Joe McCarthy, U p
I960), p. 23*
% e n ® Schoor,
P. 20.

kfalktewl i m i U M

M s m& m, * (Hew fork,
(Hew ?ork, 1963)
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1?
friend took up that ambition.” 3?
Simile still, a student, planning to go to Princeton University, Kennedy was asked by M s father, “What
would you do if you were President of the United. States?”
Ufa answer wag* ”I*a not sure, I don't know enough to
answer that*”^

The ipestioa asked referred to the im-

fending threat of Hitler and M s one*thousand-year Reich.
She reference itself was specific, and yet the answer given
could he applied to any area of politics with which the
president sight he concerned.

John Kennedy was thorough

in his academic research and the competitive drive instilled
in him by his father drove him to get all the facts, to
know ail the circumstances before

any generalization

or any decision.
like a good poker-player, a master broker
(Kennedy) must he cool-headed and clearminded, utterly realistic about his own hand
awit that of M « oooonents • unflustered end
unwiHing to he hurried ... He has dealt so
long with intractable problems that he resists^
sweeping judgments a*jd doctrinaire solutions *
It might therefore he Said that John Fitzgerald Kennedy's
familr fa.ftircrpfwmri- the political inheritance of his aacestry, *w<!* t^e competitive spirit ««<*>»% M s immediate family
led him to view the presidency as the goal toward which
he had to canal his ambitions,
a political battle to be won.

the presidency represented
the stakes were high, hut

37iM£.* P* 22.
3%ehoor, op.clt.f p. b9.
^ B u m s , op.clt.. p. M l .
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tli® position was there for the taking f and who could fill
that position hotter than a Kennedy?
ft i«LteX
the concept each individual holds of the President
and of his functions, duties and powers varies, to a cer
tain extent,, with his vantage point*

To the voter, the

presidency is the highest.office in the land*

If legis

lation fails to become lav It is the responsibility of
the Chief Legislator, the President*

To the serviceman,

the President is his Commander-In-Chief, and military
allocations and benefits are made available through his
efforts*

To the Representative and to the Senator,, legis

lators in their .own right, the President is both friend and
foe*

The degree to which the President is able to exercise

his powers is dependent on the degree to which he is able
to control the Legislative Rouses*
The men who share in governing this country
frequently appear.to act as though they were
in business for themselves. There is no
reason to suppose that **« men of large but
differing responsibilities will see all things
through the same glasses* On the contrary* It
is to be expected that their views ••• will
vary with the differing, perspectives
particular responsibilities evoke.*10
The position held by John F* Kennedy during his
terms as Representative and Senator differed somewhat from
the concept he held as President*

His view differed not

in regard to what the office was, but in regard to the
1%iehard R. Heustadt,
of. L e a d e r s * !jp , (jfew fork, lyol), pp.
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manner in which the power# of that office were to be im
plemented.

In setting out to reach his objective in the

political field, Kennedy held to the belief that “they
kl
don’t giwe prises for being second best*'* * the motiva
tion driving him to his political goal can be explained
rather simply.
battle.

He wanted to be in the front line of

At the outset of his first congressional campaign

in 19**6 he saidt
It is interesting enough watching. There*s
some sense of gratification writing about the
big men, about all this manoeuvring. It’s a
lot more lnteresfAnte iminar «*rt of the same*
some aanoouvrlmt on roar own. It’s ltitft
the difference between watching a football game
from the fifty yard ..line and naming a football
down the field with the good blocking in front
of y0u **2
Kennedy was camtioaed by his father that "yon don*t
play m the Varsity the t e s t time you get into scrimmage.”
Kennedy’s answer was to set the guideline along which his
political career was to proceed.

“This is m e game in which

I am going to get my letter."1^
She general attitude of members of the Legislature
cannot be termed one of indifference | it is an attitude that
calls for a -Jockeying for position*

“the struggle between

the executive and the legislative is endless.

The President

will master Congress if he can.} the Congress will make the
**%eh®0Fv op.clt.. p. 161.
». 156.
^ibld.. p. 157.
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President its servant, if it can.1*1*^ And yet, while this
attitude continues to prevail, members of Congress often
hold to the view that the Administration's proposed policies
will succeed If the nation is given strong, creative leader
ship by its president*

Kennedy was not one to dismiss the

importance of a strong executive and he was moved hy the
TJ-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the BisenhowerKhrushchev summit meeting to write i
Hay 17, I960, marked the end of an era — an
era of Illusion — the illusion that platitudes
and slogans are a substitute for strength and
planning — the illusion that personal good will
is a substitute for hard, carefully prepared
bargaining on concrete Issues — the illusion
that good intentions and pious principles are.
a substitute for strong, creative leadership.**?
The creative leadership emphasized by Kennedy was
not considered the sole possession of the Chief Executive.
This leadership was considered desirable in any political
representative,
clear.

fils stand on this issue was made quite

He did not advocate a specific line of action or

recommend any way in which this quality of leadership might
be realized by the leaders In the government, but he did
state the necessity for political courage, action, and
leadership on the part of any elected official.
Today the ohallo&ge of politloal courage looms
larger than ever before. Our political life is
becoming so expensive, so mechanized, and so
dominated by professional politicians and public
relations men that the idealist who dreams of
^afiossitt, QP.clt.. p. 21.
^John F. Kennedy,
1961), p.v.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91
W
rntm

independent statesmans!lip Is rudely awaked by
the necessity ©f elections and accomplishment.
Only the very ©curagecus will be able to take
the hard and unpopular decisions necessary for
®ar survival la l b struggle with a powerful
©near «**■ an enemy with leaders who need give
little thought t© the popularity of their course,
who need pay little tribute to the public opinion
they theaseAves manipulate, and who may force,
without fear of retaliation at the polls, their
citizens to sacrifice present laughter for future
ry. And only the very courageous will be able
keep alive the spirit of individualism and
dissent which gave birth to this nation, nourished
it as an infant and .carried it through, its severest
tests upon the attainment of maturity.**®

e

Kennedy1s concept of the presidency during his
years as a representative from the state of Massachusetts,
held firmly to the view that the presidency Itself was an
office second to none, that the accomplishments of the
president were dependent on his ability to mold rather
than control Congress, and to see clearly the issues of
greatest importance to the nation as a whole.

As John F.

Kennedy rose through the political hierarchy of the United
States Government, his concept changed, but not radically.
As a member of the' national legislature, it was Kennedy's
political obligation to see that the interests of the
people he represented were not ignored, and to see that the
policies advocated by the Administration were not encroachJjtg on the interests of m s constituents or on the inter
ests of the nation as a whole.
a check m

the executive.

His position was one of

As a result of the "checking"

feature of his position, it was Kennedy#s responsibility
^John f * Kennedy, tefitoI,
196b}, p. 16*

<®ew fork,
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to investigate, analyze, and distinguish between those
executive actions taken for the good of the natlont and
those actions taken for the future advantage of the Ad*
ministration*

Because of the President’s position in the

government, the failure of specific policies advocated by
the Administration rested squarely with the Chief Bxeeu*
live*

the President’s moves were to be questioned, and

advocated only after the Chief ixecmtive had proved their
worth.

A strong leader could accomplish this,

the House

of Representatives and the M a t e were the chief safe*
guards against executive control of the government, but
the President should be able to prove to the nation that
the national interest would be -Served by his policies,
this attitude too was to change as Kennedy shifted from
the legislative' branch to the executive.
"I used to wonder when I was a member of the House
how President fruman got in so much trouble.
.ginning to get the idea*

How 2 am be*

It is not difficult*"^

AJfaBtttofrr*!! tefiil
John P. Kennedy sought the presidency because that
office provided the means through which he might participate
In the front line of the world’s p o l i t i e s ! b a t t le even
was ’’the
most heavily burdened officer .in the world*”^ As he stated

l a i Z f s s & g z i &

g

M

s

w

a

?

{

W

1* *

1 *8

~

John F. Kennedy, Legacy of a President,(Vfetahlmrton)»
IM3.f 196**), p. fl.
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in one pre-election speech*
1 do not run fur the office under any expecta**
tion that it is an easy, honorary ion. I run
because the power and responsibility which the
' force of events hare thrust upon the President
sake this the wailspring of American action.
4 Senator*s voice is important# 4s a Senator
1 speak for Massachusetts* the President speaks
not only for the Baited States but for all who
desire to be free, .and who are willing to bear
the burdens of freedom#1*?
Some months prior to the Democratic National Con
vention, Kennedy expressed his concept of the Presidency.
At this stage he had still to gain primary victories in
Wisconsin and West Virginia.

In formulating this view

Kennedy actually set down the .guidelines along which he
was expected to develop the offiee to its fullest poten
tial.
Today a restricted concept of the Presidency is
not enough, for underneath today*s surface gloss
of peace and prosperity are increasingly danger
ous. unsolved, long-postponed problems — problems
that w i H inevitably explode
to the surfaceMt during
Mk
the next four years of
the next Administration
—
the growing missile gap. the rise of Communist
China., the despair of M e underdeveloped nations,
the explosive situations in Berlin and in the
Formosa Strait, the deterioration of NATO, the
lack of an arms control agreement, and el* the
domestic problems of ourfarma, cities, and
schools .50
-*--- - —
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The promises made in the heat of the presidential
campaign and the platforms approved at the National Conven
tions supposedly add to the Image the candidate wishes to
1*9lSi 4 „ p, 91,
50I.H. Whit., T m f M t t T i , 1960% Saturday Rwlaw.
March 2d, I960, p. 16.
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place before the American electorste.

This "image”, oftea

distorted hr the circumstances of the campaign, the heat
of the battle, and the Issues involved, is held up, for
comparison, to the actual action of the m m after he has
been elected to office*

The President’s biggest probleat

has been attributed to the acquisition and maintenance of
support for his program.^3* To achieve this program, the
fre.si.dent is forced to rely, to some degree, on the inage
he has projected to the public, on the "image*’ that was
elected to that office*

4s a result, the President acids

and alters the presidential office to fit his inage, and
to follow, as far as is possible given the present situa
tion, the precedents and prerogatives established by his
predecessors.
4 striking feature of our recent past has been
the transformation into routine practice of
the actions we once treated as exceptional ...
a*mI what fan* escaned statutorv reeoaaitioa
mostly been accreted into presidential common
law, confirmed Into custom, no less binding}
%U* npwlvi® Ou&w
0OBTW®l 6i |
for example, or the personally presented leg*
laxative program, or .personal, campaigning in
congressional elections.52
4 .W .A . '
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Kennedy’s concept of the presidency was exception
ally vivid during the campaign of I960.

This view was the

result of the political experience gained in the House of
Representatives and in the Senate, as well as the result
of .political expediency.

?2Neustadt, QB.elt.f pp. 5*6.
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The Platform approved toy the Democratic National
Convention of I960 was entitled "The .Bights of Has'1* The
first article of the platform states, In part, that!
It Is our continuing responsibility to provide
.am effective instrument of political action
for every American who seeks to strengthen these
rights — everywhere in America, and everywhere
in our 20th century world*
It was the object of this platform to place toe*
fore the American electorate the problems and issues con
sidered most important in the campaign of I960.

The pro

posals ranged from the areas of national defense to those
of civil rights.

John P. Kennedy’s presidential campaign

was waged along these same lines*

His nomination accept

ance speech in July* I960 called for a lew frontier.

The

fact that Kennedy felt the presidency faced a new and
critical struggle in the 1960’s was borne out in this same
speech.
The times are too grave, the ehaHemge too
urgent* end the stakes too high — to permit
the customary passions of political debate. We
ate not here to curse the darkness, tout to light
the candle that
guide us through that dark
ness to a safe and s m s future. As Winston
Churchill said on taking office some 20 years
ago | if we open a quarrel between the present
and the past, we shall toe in danger of losing
the future* today our concern must be with
that future* for the world is changing* The*,
old era is ending. The old ways will not do.?J
Kennedy called for action, on the part of Congress
Bjohn F* Kennedy, Ihf.,,!&% I&aiAlSKi (i&shlngton, B.C.,
I960), , . X
i20926
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and on the part of the electorate itself*. He went directly
to the public with a set of proposals, not a set of promises
The Hew frontier of which I speak is not a set
of promises — it is a set of challenges. It
snas up not what 1 intend to offer the American
people, but what 1 intend to ask of theaur*
The bemoeratle candidate and the platform on whieh
he ran placed emphasis on the responsibilities facing the
nation as a whole, and on the need for a president who
could not only recognise those responsibilities but was
prepared to sacrifice what was necessary for the attainment
of those goals*

Kennedy’s concept of the presidency was

one enveloping the growth of that office in the areas of
world prestige, world respesisibilityf and national welfare*
His concept was broad, as was his proposed program of action*
A dynamic president was considered necessary and the earn*
salam trail was to provide the ■»**»* of erodestins the inane
of a dynamic Kennedy to the American electorate*

X t & . I m & L m U l C^fflpalKR, 1W
The Bemoerattc national Convention provided the
initial impetus for the presidential campaign*

The cam

paign Itself provided the setting for the presentation of
Kennedy and his views to the public.
The theme of this campaign is going to be action,
action here at home to keep peace with the grow
ing needs of an standing country, and action
abroad to meet the challenge of our adversaries*
2 believe the American people elect a President
to act* He is the only one-who can speak for
p . «.
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the people of the Halted States*55
Oa a amber of occasions Kennedy was asked to
list the qualifications he considered necessary for the
Presidency*

At other times he vas asked to give his view

of the office aad the responsibilities encompassed la that
positioa*

His answers to both sets of questions give a

general outline of the office as a candidate might see it.
As la all election campaigns9 the candidates talk Hissu©#M
and tend to steer the campaign talk to the .successes or
failures of the party presently holding office*

In pre

senting himself to the publicf Senator John F. Kennedy
talked “issues1*t expressed his opinion on Quemoy and Matsu,
Cuba, and federal intervention In labour-management dis
putes, and stated rather forcefully the duties of the
presidency as he saw lt9. as well as the qualifications
needed by an American leader of the Sixties*
Chi September 29, I960, Senator Kennedy was asked,
"What do you think are the qualities In a President which
^mafce a great President?**

He answered:

Well, X think, of course, great times make
Presidents and great men* that is a factor.
Washington, llneoln, Wilson, Roosevelt — X
think that they lived in times of crises and
met the crises* In addition X would say vital
ity. Tfaoodore Roosevelt had thatf so did
Jefferson, a sense of the future and the past
and a wl.de cultural experience which makes it
possible for them to draw on the lives of other
men and the experiences of other men *»<* apply
it to a particular situation, moral courage, a
iqfiQ ^ o h n ^ F ^ e n n a d ^ R i e ^rd^M.^Mixon^||levl8i^n Debates—
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sens© of the future, a sense of the met, a
physical vitality, intellectual vitality,
intellectual curiosity and purpose.?®
in the following'day, September 30, Kennedy stated
that,
The President is really the center of dovermment, of opinion. He molds it. that is the
function of the President, The President is
the only one who speaks for all the people,
and ... on a great issue, he should speak to
the people.57
On Movember 5* 19&0, three days before the American
public was to go to the polls, both candidates, Richard M.
Hlxon and John f # Kennedy, provided statements outlining
their individual v i e w of the Presidency*
Vice-President Mixon held that greatness in a
President was not the result of that individual1* ambi
tion.*

*1 President will he great, only to the extent that

he represents tod articulates the Ideals —
ideals —

of the people of the nation."

the highest
Mixon held that

the ideals of the American people w i l d determine the degree
of greatness achieved by the President, regardless of his
individual ambition, but dependent on his ability to mold
and represent the Ideals of the nation.
itoator Kennedy viewed the President and the pres
idency as an individual in. a singular situation, his a c tio n s

^•mwdy,

Hina, Iri.wl.lon Debit... p. 111.
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and his success being dependent m bis Interpretation of
the Constitution and on bis ability to act whan and where
he cleaned action necessary.
>.The powers given to the President of the
United ftates by the Constitution are numer
ous. and' In many ways* the powers are flexible*
They leave it to the nan. They leave it to his
own good judgment* m m Presidents have been
native* n*3ehftw«» and Lincoln cap* within m e seeding years. Buchanan did nothing and let
the eouatry drift toward the war of 1861 f Lincoln
did everything «-*» Theodore Eoosevelt, Woodrow
Wilson, Franklin Boosevelt, Harry Truman — all
saw the Presidency as a strong* powerful voice
of the United Stales* Only the President speaks
for the American people ... In a free society he
is the center of action# Only the President of
the United States can. M ace before the American
people the unfinished business of our society,
can serve to direct them toward the goal of
great national purpose, can rally their forces
and energy
inly the President of the United
States, in a very real sense, can place before
us the public .interest, can rally the people
of the united States to compete successfully,
which 1 believe we can do, against our adver
saries •«« The President must be for the people#
He must sound the chord that is in all of us,
of devotion to our eountry, and 1 believe, in
the 1960*®, the President of the United States
must rally the people, must move then forward,
ansi move our country, must place before the
people our unfinished business* X
believe the Presidency can be the greatest
possible Importance — and is really the reason
X run for the Presidency. after 1** years in Conss — can. be the .greatest possible importance
the great struggle for freedom which takes
place here and all around the world. And for
freedom to be successful reauires a strong,
progressive, and vital America. That*® the
Kind of America that the neat President of the
United States must set before the world.59

r

Senator John F. Kennedy, in the closing days of
the campaign and well into his term of office, saw the
Kennedy, Hixoa,

PP* 377-378*
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presidency as the centre of activity* activity in both
domestic and international fields*

The President was the

individual upon whom responsibility was to lie*
the American Presidency will demand more than
ringing manifestos issued from the rear of
battle* It w i H demand that the President
will place himself in the very thick of the
fight* that he care passionately about the
fate of the people he leadc, that he be will
ing to serve them at the risk of incurring
their momentary displeasure*®0
The views expressed during a political campaign
are oftentimes regarded as merely fee manifestation of
political expediency.

The proof of campaign pronounce

ments lies in the actualization, once the victor has ac
cepted the decision, of the electorate*

What may seem

clear-cut one day* la a specific instance, takes on an
entirely new light* given new circumstances and new re
sponsibilities.

Senator Kennedy* in the days before his

election as President, stated that the Chief Executive
must be willing to serve the American public to the best
of his ability and to act as he sees fit regardless of the
political advantage or disadvantage to himself.

In the

first days after his election* Kennedy proceeded to select
the men he considered most qualified to f l H Cabinet posi
tions*

In selecting his Cabinet Kennedy was faced with a

situation that called not for a retraction of a campaign
statement but for a realization of the leadership and de
cisive action he deemed necessary in the President of the
^Kennedy* Nikon, television Pebates* p* 603.
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Sixties*
te September 19* I960, Senator Kennedy m s asked if
be would feel any restriction in naming a member of his im
mediate family to the Cabinet*

Kennedy stated then that

such a more would probably be unwise but that he did hop®
his brothers would be able to contribute their services to
the new Administration*

He also stated, however,, that Mwe

are going to need all the people of dedication we can get**61
Little over a month later, on October 21, I960, Kennedy
stated that "I am asking the people's support as Presidentj
we will select the best men we can get#*62

The Senator from

Massachusetts had stated throughout his campaign that “all
appointments, both high and low, will be made on the basis
of ability —

without regard to race, creed, national origin,

sex, section or

occup a t i o n * ”^

In December, i960, President-elect Kennedy nominated
his brother, Robert F* Kennedy, as Attorney General of the
United States*

On January 21, 1961, Robert Kennedy was

sworn.in as lead of the Department of Justice*
The appointment of his brother as Attorney General
resulted in a deluge of critical comments, commentaries, and
editorials*

President-elect Kennedy, In answering the crit

icism leveled at one of his first decisions, and in standing
^Kennedy, Nixon,

P* 5^.

% M . d *t p. 267*
6%obert E* Thompson, Hortense Myers,Jtato&J*Jbwatat
I M l i C»ew fork, 1962), p. 16*
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by bit decision, enacted what be considered to be the most
important demand placed before the President of the Sixties that he he willing to serfs the American people at the risk
of incurring even their momentary displeasure.
Kennedy had stated that the new Administration
needed aen of competence, dedication, ability,
be 1die best men they could get.

they had to

Of his brother he said,

"lobby*s easily the best man l*ve ever m m

... 1*11 take

his word over anybody1
As President, Kennedy faced. In the 1960*s chal
lenges and demands that had to be met with instantaneous
and correct answers.

Mistakes were made, but the blame,

whether deserved or not, rested squarely with the President.
Kennedy met these challenges head-on.

He incurred criti

cism and displeasure, but he acted from the front line, with
the sole purpose of serving the American people he repre
sented.

The record of his years in the Presidency bears

t M s out —
scene,

on both the domestic .and the international

He lived the Presidency as he saw that office.

I shall devote every effort of mind and spirit
to fulfilling the oath of the Presidency —
practically Identical, X might add, with the
oath I have taken for fourteen years in the
Congress. For, without reservation, X can,
and I quote, "solemnly swear that I will faith
fully execute the office of .president of the
Halted States and will to the best of my ability
preserve, protecj^asd defend the Constitution,

HortenseMyers, m m , M
& f irtlbfi; Withla» Cirew fork, isda), p. 225*

KPOftato

I960 6flaw°lork Hi 9 ^ t0p p ^ l ^ » H g...... .............
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THE PBSSIDEHCYi THE M k m XM OFFICE
Kennedy found soon after he assumed the presidency
that the office presented a different picture to the in
cumbent than it did to even the most informed outsiders*
Circumstances, and problems arising in both the domestic
and foreign fields called for a solution and a decision on
the part of the President*

the solution could be offered

by any number of advisors, but the decision rests with one
man, the President*

Mo amount of political know-how, po

litical savvy, or specialised .education can compensate for
lack of experience in the office of the President*

He

alone is President, and he alone bears the burden of re
sponsibility*
The American Presidency is a formidable, exposed,
and somewhat mysterious institution* It is
formidable because it represents the point of
ultimate decision in the American political
system. It is exposed because decision cannot
take place in a vacuum; the .Presidency is the
canter of the play of pressure, interest, and
idea in the Mation
A wise President •••
gathers strength and insight from the Mation*
Still, in the end, he is alone* There stands
th e d e c is io n — end th e r e s ta n d s th e P re s id e n t*

"I have accustomed myself to receive with re
spect the opinions of others,* said Andrew
Jackson* *but always take the responsibility
of deciding for myself*"®®

1963, (Washington, D.C., 196*+), p.370, September 23, 19*333
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Kennedy realized that "there is no experience yon
can get that can possibly prepare yon adequately for the
Presidency."67

He gained his experience in office.

decisions he aade were his* and his alone.

The

Kennedy had

the benefit of knowledgeable advisors, but even this did
not prevent an unwise decision from being aade.

The Kennedy

Administration aade advances in the domestic field, par
ticularly in the area of civil rights.
On the other hand, he was the recipient of criti
cism for his handling of the steel crisis in 1962.

The

Federal government had intruded into an area supposedly
confined to labor and to management.

The international

sphere seemed to dominate Kennedy's interest during his
term of office.

What advances did he make

here?

How did

the actions of President Kennedy, in both domestic and
international affairs, compare with the duties, and re
sponsibilities of the President, as seen by that same man?
fflm

J mbi

Xn spite of the fact that actual Civil lights
Legislation was not formally passed until after his death,
John F. Kennedy has been acknowledged as a leader in the
fight for elvil right*.

He considered the l**ue of olvil

rights to be a moral issue, not merely a legal one.
This is not a legal or legislative issue alone ...
We are confronted primarily with a moral Issue.
■Til181 -.r-JL262> P* 551# ©ecember 17, 1962.
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It is at old as the Scriptures and Is as clear
as the American Constitution* The heart of
the question is whether all Americans are to
he afforded equal rights .and equal opportunities,
whether we are going to treat our fellow Amer
icans as we want to he treated
This nation,
for all.its hopes and all its boasts will not
he fully free until all its citizens are free
We face therefore, a moral crisis as a country
and as a people* It cannot he met hy repres
sive police action* It cannot he left to in
creased demonstrations in the streets* It
cannot he quieted hy token mores ... It is a
time to act in the Congress, in your state and
local legislative body, and above all, in all of
our daily lives.©*5
How did Kennedy*s classification of civil rights, as a
moral issue, enter Into Presidential responsibility?
Kennedy held that the President nrust he a moral leader.
It is his responsibility, as President,, to "set the moral
imperative**^

Kennedy’s federalizing of troops in June,

1963, was considered necessary to carry out an order of
the United States District Court of the Wortham District
of Alabama*

The use of the Alabama National Guard brought

hack memories of the use of federal troops in Arkansas in
195^*

Where did the difference lief
During the presidential campaign of I960, Kennedy

stated that president Eisenhower should have commented on
the Supreme Court Decision of 195** regarding the segrega
t io n of s c h o o l* *

Ho f a i t th o P r e s id e n t, as one who speaks

for a H the people, should speak to the people*
68Harry Golden.
Conn*, 196%), pp.213-215*

t M Ifiarftgg» (Greenwich,

6%elevi,ilm Ite&it.ej, i960, p. 152.
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The implementation of the Court decision is
within the Court1* Judgment. They are the
ones who here said hy whet speed end what
manners the Court decision would he carried
out* But 1 think that the President should,
in the future | indicate his belief that we
should work and strife toward equality of
opportunity for American*#'0
Kennedy carried out this thought in confronting
the American public with the events in Alabama on June
11, 1963.

He called then for specific Civil lights leg

islation in the areas of employment, and of public educa
tion#

He reversed what he considered a lapse on the part

of President Eisenhower and went directly to the nation,
to express his conviction and to propose action on the
issue at hand*

The use of federalized troops was consid

ered necessary in this instance but only after the facts
.surrounding 'the basic issued of equality and civil rights
were made clear to the American public*
Kennedy was faced with several alternatives*

He

could have left the Implementation of the court decision
up to the officials of the state or he could have feder
alized the militia and taken action himself*

He chose the

second alternative because of the Issues involved and be
cause of his position as moral leader of the nation.

Had

he left th e Implementation of th e court decision to th e
officials of the state there is little doubt that the de
cision would be ignored*

The decision m s, in fact, opposed
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by the state executive and implementation would have been
virtually impossible*
The steel crisis in 1962 paralleled a situation,
Involving the steel industry, handled by Vice-president
Nixon.

Again, during the presidential campaign of I960,

Senator Kennedy was questioned as to M s evaluation of
the steel strike settled by Vice-president Nixon.

Kennedy

stated that he considered federal intervention necessary
but that the aetioa taken by the Vice-president should
have been taken sooner.

He stressed the fact that he felt

the influence and power position of tee President should
have been and could have been used more effectively at an
earlier date, with the result being an earlier settlement*
Be did state that, "There is a place for federal interven
tion, parti^Marly in national emergency strikes.**71
te April, 1962, a settlement had been reached
between tee steel union and tee management*

At tee same

time, steel management announced an increase in steel price*
President Kennedy, at a national press conference on April
11, 1962, denounced tee price increase on tee grounds that
it was unjustified.

Kennedy defended his intervention into

this matter, which would usually have been considered beyond
the scope of federal interference in a free enterprise econ
omy,in tee following manner«
Price and wage decisions in this country,
exceptfor a very limited restriction in

p* iaa*
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the case of monopolies and national emergency
strikes, are and ought to ho freely and pri
vately oado* But the American people have a
right to expect, in return for that freedom,
a higher sens® of business responsibility
for the welfare of their country than haa
been shown."2
At the sane tine, a labor dispute involving the
West Coast sarltine industry posed a threat to national
health and safety.

In slalng up the'situation on the

West Coast, President Kennedy issued an executive order
establishing a board of inquiry to investigate the issues
involved*

Federal intervention was deemed necessary and

action was taken.
In two instances then John P. Kennedy, as Presi
dent, entered into a labor dispute ..and .into a dispute over
price increases.

The action taken in both oases was con

sidered necessary to preserve the national welfare.

The

President had acted to serve the people of the nation,
“even with the risk of incurring their momentary displeasure•"
The

sow

She American President is many men to many people.
The sphere with which he primarily concerns himself w i H
often determine the direction to which public interest
will t u r n .

In the

<s«»e o f P re s id e n t K ennedy, th e i n t e r 

national sphere of politics presented the biggest problems
facing his Administration.

At the end of the presidential

72flg,f8MimUftl,Mmm», — A 2 & U p. 317, April 11, 1962.
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campaign* Kennedy stated tee qualifications be considered
necessary in an American President of tee i960* s.

He also

stated tee position teat should toe held toy tee President*
Pennsylvania Avenue is no longer a local Wash
ington thoroughfare. It runs through Paris
and London* Ankara and Teheran* Hew Delhi and
Tokyo. And if Washington Is tee capital of tee
free world, tee President must toe its leaderj
our Constitution requires it, oar history re
quires it* oar survival, requires it *73
tee isolationism of the 1920*8 and 1930*s was considered
a closed chapter in American history,

tee American polit

ical arena focused its attention on tee international sit
uation* with particular regard, to national security, and
international .freedom.
,tee.se are extraordinary times* And we face
an extraordinary challenge. Our strength as
well as our convictions have imposed upon this
nation tee role of leader in freedom*s cause.
Ho role in history could toe more difficult or
more important. That Is our conviction for
ourselvest that is our only commitment to
others* Ho friend, no adversary should think
otherwise* We are not against any man* or any
nation, or any system* except as it is hostile
to freedom »•* And while no nation has ever
faced, such a challenge, no nation has ever been
so ready to seise tee burden and the glory of
freedom*?1*
The Kennedy Administration faced a number of
crises in the international steers of politics during its
firet few years,

tee first such encounter with
f • 603*

1<afel

Kennedy*

9 JOhn P. Kennedy* 9|hf.
fork* 196**), p* 20.

.

(New
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Coobm ]itst forces culminated fa the abortive Bay of figs
Invasion in April, 1961.

la Angust, 1961, a wall was

erected la East Seraany, separating last and West Berlin,
la October, 1962, Cuba again took over the political spot
light as President Kennedy called for a quarantine of the
island.
gotiated*

In Inly, 1963, a nuclear test baa treaty was ne
The treaty was signed In October, 1963*

all International ©rises were successes*

Not

The Bay of Pigs

invasion m s an unqualified failure that could have cat
apulted the world into a large-scale nuclear war*

The

second Cuban crisis was a successful venture on the part
of the United Itates, but that, too, could have thrust nu
clear war on the nations of the world.

The erection of

the Berlin H S U presented a crisis in itself, but the im
mediate deployment of troops to the area aade clear the
Western intention to honour commitments.

This situation

could also have resulted in full-scale war.

The signing

of the nuclear test ban treaty on Oetober 25, 1963, less
than a month before President Kennedy was assassinated,
represented the culmination of years of attempts to nego
tiate such an agreement.

It was **an important first step —

a step toward peace, a step toward reason, a step —

a

step away from war."7?
The international scene was not quiet during the
Kennedy years in the White House*

Flare-ups occurred in
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hi
the Congo, Laos, Vietnam, Cuba and Berlin*

The last two

areas were of primary concern to Kennedy and to the nation*
Cuba, a snail island ninety miles south of the
Florida coastline, presented an unpleasant picture to the
United States*
island ln 1959*

Fidel Castro had taken over control of the
Since then Cuba had steadily acred toward

an alltaace with luaala.

In April, 1961, Cuban refugees

launched an invasion of the island*

The invasioaary force,

backed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United
States, with m e knowledge of the President and his advi
sors, attempted to gain a foot-held in Cuba*
attempt failed dlsasterously.

The invasion

Over 1,000 men were made

prisoners of war*
Five days before the invasion attempt, President
Kennedy had stated that “there will not be, under any con
ditions, an intervention in Cuba by the United States Armed
Forces.”?6

Shortly after the invasion, the American public

and the rest of the world m s informed of American complic
ity in the action*

The resulting failure of the invasion

brought criticism from both sides*

The rightists denounced

the President for failing to provide the air-cover necessary
to insure success*

Others caressed concern that the Pres

ident would accept such a plan*77

The President accepted

76FliaARliP.garf, .T.i.i261» p# 256, April 12, 1961.
77tfiUiam Manchester, Portrait of a President. (Hew
York, 19©*0, p. lei.
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full responsibility for the decisions aade concerning the
notion and for its subsequent failure.

His prims concern

steamed from the threat to American security and freedoat
and Ultimately to the security and freedom of the countries
of the world, not merely the countries presently composing
the free world.-*
Cuba is not an island unto Itself $ and our
concern is not ended by mere expressions of
nonintervention or regret ... It is clear that
this Nation, in concert with all the free na
tions of this hemisphere, must take an ever
closer and more realistic lock at the menace
of external Communist intervention and domi
nation in Cuba* It is not primarily our
interest or our security but theirs which is
now, today, in the .greater peril.. It is for
their sake as well, as our own that we must
show cur will •*• We oust build a hemisphere
where freedom can flourish | and where any free
nation under outside attack of any kind can be
assured that all of cur resources stand ready
to respond to any request for assistance ...
let me then make clear as the President of
the Halted States that I am determined upon
our system*s survival and success, regardless
of the cost and regardless of the peril*/8
The lay of figs invasion is recorded as a Eaek
mark, on the Kennedy record*

Some measure of satisfaction

can be derived from this failure, however, satisfaction
that the public was presented with the facts, albeit after
the invasion and its failure had been liberally publicised
by the victorious Castro regime*

the fact of the matter

remains that the American public eventually received infor
mation of the CIA complicity and advice, of the President's
April7^ ! ^ ! ^ 111 9*

PP* 305-306,
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action on that advice, and of the Presidentvs full accept
ance of responsibility for the entire action*

The decision

made mis the President*s alone and the responsibility
rested with him*

The buck stopped in the Oval Office of

the White Bouse*
What alternative courses of action were open to
Kennedy when he was confronted with the Bay of Pigs oper
ation?

Kennedy could have called the plan off, he could

have supported the plan, placing some restrictive consid
erations on it, or he could have further implemented the
operation by providing full American military assistance,
thus assuring the success of the venture*
If the plan had been stopped short of implementa
tion, the 1HOO Cuban exile in training would have been
turned loose to "spread the word that Kennedy had betrayed
their attempt to depose

Castro

*"<^ At the same time, it

was also brought to Kennedy*s attention that if the planned
Invasion was discarded, no similar attempt could be made
in the future without specific American military assistance*
The cause for alarm stemmed from the fact that the CIA ex
pected a build up of arms to Cuba and an increase to the
trained personnel necessary to build up CastE>*s forces*
ftussian aid to toe Cuban dictator was felt inevitable in
this respect*
? % * Sorenson, Kennedy, "Kennedy* s Worst Disaster",
to Look* Vol* 29, No* Id, August 10, 1965, P* Mf.
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If Kennedy had accepted the alternative calling
for full American military assistance, the invasion at
tempt would likely have succeeded hut American participa
tion in such a venture would have meant a full-fledged
invasion hy the fnited States*

Such action would have been

contrary to American tradition and could have proven more
harmful to the "cause of freedom throughout the hemisphere
than even Castro*s continued presence.0

In addition,

American forces were already below strength and if any of
these forces had been engaged in guerilla warfare in Cuba,
the Communists could have then stepped-up moves in Berlin,
81
or Laos or any other area of Contention* *
The third alternative given Kennedy, and the one
with which he concurred, called for implementation of the
invasion plan on the part of Cuban exiles.
itary assistance was not to he provided#

American mil

The information

made available to the President had assured him that Amer
ican intervention was not considered essential to the suc
cess of the operation#

fhe momentum of the Cuban exile

movement would have supposedly drawn a good deal of sup
port from the Cuban masses and would have triggered a
large-scale revolution on the island.

As was evident in

April, 1961, this information was vastly misleading.
8°Ibid.t p.
% M d . . p. V h
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Kennedy accepted the information given bin by the
"experts".

fhn result was the Bay of Pigs disaster.

He

could have taken various other courses of action, but the
on® course deemed feasible and consistent with U.S. non
intervention policy was the alternative selected.

The fact

that the President was misinformed of the true situation
did not alter his decision to accept responsibility for the
fiasco.
"There*s an old saying that victory has a
hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan ...
1 an the responsible officer of the Gov
ernment, and that is quite obvious* ”32
In August, 1961, the Berlin Mall %fias constructed.
West Berliners were cut off completely from Bast Berlin.
Bast Berliners were Isolated froa any contact with the free
world and her representatives.

United States Armed Forces

had. been moved into the area previous to the action taken
by the last Berlin government#

In July, 1961, Kennedy had

made mention of the crisis in Berlin, and made specific
reference to the Khrushchev aide memoirs to end the abnormal
division in Germany.
He (Khrushchev) .intends to bring to an end,
through a stroke of the pen, first our legal
rights to be in West Berlin — and secondly
our ability to make good on our commitment to
the two million free people of that city,
that we cannot permit* we are clear about
what must be done — and we intend to do It •••
we do not want to fight — but we have fought
before •«« WO must meet our oft-stated pledge
to the free peoples of West Berlin — and
82Sorenson, oo.cit#, p.50.
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maintain our rights and their safety, even in
the face .of fore# — in order to maintain the
confidence of other free peoples in our word
and enr resolve* the strength of the alliance
on which our security depends is dependent in
turn on our willingness to meet our- commitments
to them ... We do not intend to abandon our
. duty to mankind to seek a peaceful solution ...
We shall always be prepared to discuss inter
national problems with any*and ail nations
that are wSJ&lng to talk —
listen — with
reason* If they hare proposals— not demands —
we #foell hear them* If they seek genuine under
standing — not concessions of our rights — we
shall meet them **• We seek peace — but we
shall not surrender *■#* fhe freedom of,that
city (West Berlin) is not negotiable.
In August, Kennedy was faced with the physical manifesta
tion of that "abnormal” division*

fhe United States com

mitment in Berlin was made after the settlement of World
tor II*

That commitment is still being upheld today*

The

decision of the President of the Waited States to call into
action the National Heserves, to strengthen the U.S. mili
tary position in the divided city, and to protect American
and tost German rights in the city, stands to strengthen
the political position of the Waited States in Europe and
to dispel any fears.that the United States, when faced with
a threat to national security, will disregard the commit
ments to

eh#

haniaii herself *

I am not here to present a new military doc
trine, bearing any one name or aimed at any
one area*®*! am here to promote the freedom
doctrine
8%ybSytft.,J>
Alfri

PP* £33-5**Ot July 25, 1961.

8**teUG„ I t M f g 19,^1, p. 397, May 25, 1961.
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The Kennedy decision in this instance was to
bolster U.S. defensive foveas in West Berlin.

He could

have ignored the Wall9 or he could have sent troops in to
prevent farther Communist advancement •
I f the Mall was ignored —

who coaid have possibly

said what other Communist move night later go unchallenged.
Bow far would the Communists have pushed before they reached
the point where the 17.S. would have been forced to resist
such advances or withdraw?

To have Ignored the Mall would

have opened the door for possible Communist gains in Germany.
In the event Kennedy sent troops to reinforce the
American position in West Berlin and "face* was maintained
by the American demonstration that her commitment would
continue to hold*

The Communists were thereby “reassured*

that the U.S. under Kennedy, would not be forced back by
moves such as the construction of the Berlin w a ll.
In October | 1962 f the American public was presented
with the information that ninety miles south of the Florida
coastline was a military installation capable of striking,
with effective force, any major American city.

The deci

sion of the President was to establish and enforce a strict
quarantine of the Island until such time as the missiles
and military weapons were removed from the island.

The

quarantine was proclaimed on October 23, 1962 and put into
effect on October 2**. The reason for the quarantine was,
as in previous incidents, the security and freedom of the
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Western hemisphere.
file 9911 of freedom Is always high — Wet
Americans Have always paid it. And on© path
we shall newer cheese, aad that is the pith
of surrender or
the victory of might* hat the vindication of
right — not pease'at the expense of freedom,
hat both pease and freedom, here in this
heaisphere9 and, we hope, around the world*0?
fhe stand taken by Kennedy raised the prospect
that the tension existing between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union might he essalated into a nuclear war.
considered necessary.

Action was

Both the United States government

and the government of the Soviet Union were faced with the
possibility of confrontation with military destruction of
the highest order,

fhe resultant removal of Soviet missiles

and military installations from the island of Cuba served
to quiet the situation and to emphasize the American Pres
ident's willingness to take' 'the action he deems necessary,
as President, for the safety of the American nation and, as
leader of the West, for the safety of the nations of the
free world*
In this second Unban crisis, Kennedy was faced
with six possible moves.

He couldi H(l) do nothing| (2)

bring diplomatic pressures and warnings to bear on the
Sovietsf (3) wadertake a secret approach to Castro, to
split him off from the Soviets, to warn him that the alter
native was his Island's downfall and that the Soviets were
selling him out§ (b) initiate Indirect military action by
8^aahllg.J>
Jiail,
J I , 1362, W * 806- 809, October 22, 1962.
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means of a blockade* ($) conduct an air strike, pinpointed
against the missiles only.or against other Military targets,
with or without advance warning* or (6) launch an invasion."88
If Kennedy had dome nothing, the security of the
United States would remain at stake.

In the sane Instance,

If the missile build»up in Cuba had been Ignored, how much
further would the Communists have pushed to gain strength
In the Americas?

If Kennedy had merely issued a warning,

through diplomatic channels, there would have been no actual
pressure exerted on the Soviets other than the pressure of
words.

Actions would undoubtably be forthcoming, but the

Soviets would have received advance warning and could pos
sibly be prepared for any such move on the part of the United
States.

If Kennedy had merely taken Castro aside end stated

that the fate of Cuba hung In the balance of power struggle,
the way would be olear for Castro to denounce the United
States as an. aggressor, clting the Minformation" given him
by Kennedy as proof*
fhe fourth course of action open to Kennedy was
to initiate indirect military action in the form of a
blockade*

He took this course of action In the belief

that such a show of strength and decisiveness on the part
of the United States would serve to alert both the Soviets
and Cubans and the nations of the latest to the faet that
the United States was prepared and willing to take the
86t * Sorenson, "Kennedy vs. Khruschevi fhe Showdown in
Cuba", Look, Vol. 19, No. 18, Sept. 7, 1965, p. 51.
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action considered necessary to preserve her security.
If Kennedy had taken the fifth or sixth courses
of action ©pea to him he would have involved the United
States in hand to hand, contest in Cuba*

Either of the novas

could easily have escalated the Soviets into a show of
nuclear strength and ultimate nuclear annihilation*
fhe President had stated * in M s campaign for the
presidency and throughout his termf that the .asm in offiee
had an obligation to the people to inform them of the facts*
in the whole it can tee said that such was the case with
the Kennedy Administration*

the first Cuban crisis of

1961 may dispute t M s 9 bait the American public was even*
twally given the facts*

fhe Berlin, crisis of 1961 was re*

ported to the American peoplef and the need for decisive
American build-up in military forees was explained*

fhe

Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was explained to the public;
the action taken was also clarified*

President Kennedy

seems to have followed.! perhaps not always consistently!
the lines of conduct he posited as a candidate9 as teeing
applicable to the President of the United States*
.Kennedy stated throughout M s campaign .and M s
years in the WMte House that peace m s the objective of
M s action in the international arena*

Peace was the ob

jective as long as freedom was not denied*

On duly 26f.

1963, Kennedy announced the eonelusions of negotiations
for a medear test ban treaty*
0etoteer.t 1963+

That treaty m s signed in

It represented the culmination of years of
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effort to reach an understanding and an agreement on the
control of nuclear weapons*

fhe treaty represented a

step forward os the path toward eventual peace*

The de

cision to accept the treaty was not, strictly speaking,
Kennedy*s alone, for it was the result of years of nego
tiation and effort on the part of a somber of individuals.
The final actios was taken by the President.

He informed

the public of the treaty and of the implications of that
agreement.

It was an achievement of his Administration

and of the President himself*

It might also be termed the

partial fulfillment of his inaugural addresst
bet every nation know, whether it wishes us
well or i n , that we shall pay any price,
bear any burden, meet any hardship, support
any friend, oppose any foe to assure the
survival and the success of liberty ... To
those nations who would make themselves our
adversary, we offer not a pledge but a re
quest i that both sides begin anew the quest
for peace, before the dark powers of destruc
tion unleashed by science engulf all humanity
in planned or accidental self-destruction ...
let both sides explore what problems m i t e us
instead of belabouring those problems which
divide us* bet both sides, for the first time,
formulate serious and precise proposals for
the inspection and control of arms — and
bring the absolute power to destroy other
nations under the absolute control of all
nations ••• And if a beach-head of co
operation may push, back the jungle of sus
picion, let both sides join in creating a
new endeavour, not a new balance of power,
but a new world of law, where the strong are
just and the weak secure and the peace pre
served*®?

.jr-iatt, January 20, 1961, pp. 1-2*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

M u .

John F. Kennedy was elected President on November
3i 1930 and was Inaugurated m

January 20, 1931.

Kennedy

m s destined to serve two years, ten months, sad two days
as President of the Waited States*

Waring that time, the

Halted States had managed to make noteworthy advances In
the field of space exploration, some advance la the field
of eivil rights, and had become more deeply Involved in
seeking a detente with the Soviet Union.

1a adequate eval

uation of Kennedy1* years In the tfhlte House cannot be made
without consideration of the Alliance for Progress, the
Peace Corps, and the wheat agreement with the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, the Kennedy years were not all successful
years.

The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the furor

over a military installation on Cuba., the landing of troops
In Laos and in Berlin, and increased American Involvement
In Vietnam served to draw criticism toward the Administra
tion.

During those same years, Kennedy saw, In retrospect,

a difference In action possible on the part of the Presi
dent and a difference In his own concept of the office.
The problems were more difficult than I had
imagined they were. There is (also) a limita
tion upon the ability of the United States to

n
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solve these problems ••• tore Is a limitation
on t o power of t o United States to bring
about solutions ... I weald say t o t t o prob
lems are more difficult t o t I had imagined
t o m to be* and tore are greater limitations
upon our ability to bring about a favourable
result t o n I had imagined them to be* And I
think t o t is probably t o e of anyone t o be
comes President, because tore is such a dif
ference between those t o advise or speak or
legislate, and between t o man t o oust select
from t o various alternatives proposed end say
■ t o t this shall be t o policy of t o United
States. It is much easier to make the speeches
t o n it is to ftelly make t o judgments, because
unfortunately your advisors are frequently di
vided* If you take t o wrong course, and on
occasion I have, t o President bearsJjbe burden
of t o responsibility quite rightly.88
It is possible, in looking over t o achievements
of t o Kennedy Administration and in considering the set
backs suffered during t o Kennedy years, to conclude that
Kennedy himself realized the responsibilities of his office,
accepted those responsibilities, listened to his advisors,
and made t o final decisions himself*^

He did not solve

all t o problems facing t o United States and t o Free
World, and was not able to accomplish all he intended to,
but Kennedy did gain a greater respect for the power of the
Congress^ and, at t o same time, was able to evaluate his
a8P»bUt P i M a i

lattt ieesmbey 17, 1962, p. 889.

89S©e 26a, p.12 — Jacksonian statement on Presidential
power and responsibility*
9Q«It is a tremendous change to go from being a Senator
to being President ... t o fact is I think t o Congress
looks more powerful sitting here than it did when I was
tore in t o Congress
Wien you are in t o Congress you
are one of a hundred in t o Senate or one of b p in t o House,
so the power is divided* But here I look at the Congress and
I look at t o collective power of t o Congress, particularly
t o bloc action, and it Is a substantial power." 1M&., Pecember 17, 1962, p. 892.
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own legislative program*
They are two separate offices and two separate
powers, the Congress and the Presidency* There
Is bound to be conflict, but they most co
operate to the degree that is possible* But
that is why no President* s program is ever
at in. The only time a President's program
s pnt in quiekly and easily Is when the pro
gram is insignificant. But if it is signif
icant and afreets important interest and is
controversial, therefore, then there is a
fight, and the President is never wholly successful.91

f

President John P* Kennedy faced a number of set
backs bat continued In the face of these disappointments
to act as leader of the American nation and of the free
world*

He saw the Presidency as a goal to be gainedf he

gained that goal and saw then the responsibility of leader
ship.

Be managed to combine legislative experience, and

some degree of executive leadership in fulfilling the re
sponsibilities of the Presidency as he saw them! to serve
the people of the nation, "even with the risk, of incurring
their momentary displeasure*1’ He was aware of the problems
of the office and aware that he was not the sole answer*
"I had plenty of problems when I ease in, but wait until
the fellow that follows m

sees what he will inherit.”?2

John f * Kennedy say not have been the greatest
President the United States has seen or will see, bat the
Kennedy years in the Whit# House will not soon be forgotten.
91W 3 , l t .
92B i U Adler, The,

»*«• 179 196a, p* B9b*
(Toronto, 196b), p*70*
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1 want above all else to be a President .known —
at the end of four years — as one who not only
prevented war but won the peace — as one of
whoa history sight sayi he not only laid the
foundations for peace In his time, bat for the
generations to eoae as well ... X want to be a
President known — at the end of four years —
as one who not only held back the Communist
tide bat advanced the cause of freedom and re*
built American prestige — not by words but by
works — not by stating great aims merely as a
good debater* bat by doing: great deeds as a
good neighbour — not. by loirs and conferences
abroad, but by vitality and direction at hone ...
I want to be a President who will regain that
office for the people
X want to be a Pres
ident of all the people •
X want to be a
President who has the confidence of the people —
and who takes the people Into his confidence —
who lets then, know what he Is doing and where
we are going* who Is for his program and who
Is against
I want to be a President who
sets as well as reacts — who originates pro
grams as w e n as study groups — who masters
comelex orobleats as well as <>«* ease memeran—
dams
X want to be a President who is the
Chief Incentive In every sense of the word —
who responds to a problem, not by hoping his
subordinates will act, but by directing them
to act — a President who is willing to take
the responsibility for getting things done,
and take the blame If they are not done right •«*
X want to be a President who believes in working
full *4««>
of
and women are
forced to work part time «•* X want to be a
President who cares ••• X want to be a Presi
dent who Is concerned ••• X want to be a Pres
ident who recognises every eltisen's rights as
wall as his obligations •*» X want to be the
President of a country which raises the farmer's
income instead of his costs ••• X believe in a
President who will formulate and fight for his
legislative policies ... A President who will
not back down under pressure ... A President
who does not speak from the rear of the battle
but who places himself in the
of the
fight :*«« X also believe in a President who
fights for great ideals as well as legislation —
a President who cares deeply about the people
he represents — their right to a full-time
job with full-time pay — to raise their chil
dren In decent neighbourhoods — to send their
eoae
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children to a good school *— to share In
the benefits of oar abundance and our
natural resources — and to retire to a
life of dignity .and health ... Above all
X believe In a President who believes In
the national Interest — who serves no
other master — who takes no instruction
tut those of his conscience — who puts no
personal interest, no public pressure, no
political hopes, and so private obligation
of any kind ahead of his path to promote
the national interest #**93
History will decide whether or not John F* Kennedy
uni that President*

9^0oris S. Whitne
n*hSiu»U|S
*?«*■##
lew fork Coliseum*
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